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After Lisbon: A More Political European Union 




This article argues that with the full implementation of the Lisbon Treaty -a process due to unfold 
over the next decade- the EU will become more politically integrated. It develops a model to 
determine degrees of EU political integration, asserting that the degree of integration is 
determined by the amount of individual member-state control in the decision-making process. It 
concerns policy areas of a political character with control being defined as the ability of 
individual member states to alter the outcome of the decision-making process. For the purpose of 
gauging control, the developed model outlines three ‘decision-making settings', which this article 
then uses to demonstrate that it is through the introduction of institutional changes that the fully 
implemented Lisbon Treaty increases EU political integration.   
 
Introduction    
 Traditionally, the European Union has been regarded as a much more economically 
integrated entity, than a politically integrated one. However, this article argues that with the full 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty—a process due to unfold over the next decade—the EU will 
become more politically integrated in nature. Drawing on definitions of political integration 
provided by Ernst Haas (1958) and Leon Lindberg (1963) this article develops a model to 
determine degrees of EU political integration, asserting that the degree of integration is 
determined by the amount of individual member-state control in the decision-making process, 
concerning policy areas of a political character; control being defined as the ability of individual 
member states to alter the outcome of the decision-making process. In using this model, this 
article demonstrates that it is through the introduction of institutional changes that the fully 
implemented Lisbon Treaty creates a more politically integrated European Union. This, it is 
argued, is due to the fact that these changes decrease the amount of individual member-state 
control in the areas of asylum and immigration policy, internal customs policy, external border 
control policy, as well as police and judicial cooperation policy—policy areas of a political 
nature. 
 This article will first develop a model of EU political integration, as previously 
mentioned. It will then outline the two major institutional changes introduced by the fully 
implemented Lisbon Treaty—the dissolution of the pillar system and the identification of the 
‘ordinary legislative procedure’ as the adoption of acts by means of co-decision, with qualified 
majority voting (QMV) being used in the Council—and show why these changes diminish 
member-state control in the previously-stated policy areas. 
 
EU Political Integration: A Model   
 In his book The Uniting of Europe (1958: 16), Ernst Haas refers to political integration as 
a process whereby states shift their ‘political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions 
possess or demand jurisdiction’ over them. Leon Lindberg, on the other hand, although not 
defining political integration specifically in his book The Political Dynamics of European 
Economic Integration (1963: 5-6), presents a definition of integration, in general, that can easily 
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be applied to economic or political integration; this definition being that (political) integration is 
the employment of decision-making processes that involve ‘means other than autonomous action 
by national governments’. This article draws on these two definitions to develop its own model of 
political integration, which it uses to argue its thesis on EU political integration.  
 The model developed here asserts that the amount of political integration in the European 
Union is determined by the degree of individual member-state control in the decision-making 
process, concerning policy areas of a political nature. Political integration is regarded as 
increasing as member-state control decreases; control being defined as the ability of individual 
member states to alter the outcome of the decision-making process. This article will now outline 
the means by which this model measures member-state control, as well as the logic behind its 
categorisation of asylum and immigration policy, internal customs policy, external border control 
policy and police and judicial cooperation policy; as ‘policy areas of a political character’.  
 
Decision-making settings  
 In order to gauge control, this model outlines three decision-making settings1: one, where 
the control of individual member states over the decision-making process is the strongest—the 
inter-governmental setting, one, where individual member-state control is the weakest—the 
supranational setting, and one that falls in between these two poles—the semi-supranational 
setting. This model also identifies three factors that differentiate these settings: the holder(s) of 
policy initiating authority, the holder(s) of legislative authority and the voting system of the 
holder(s) of legislative authority.   
 In the inter-governmental decision-making setting there are two actors that hold the 
authority to initiate policy: the Commission and the member states (Europa, 2008). The power of 
initiation provides the holder with agenda-setting authority, meaning the holder has the ability to 
choose the moment for initiating action, as well as the power to choose the form the initiating 
action takes; as a result, individual member states—along with the Commission—have the ability 
to decide what is received, and how, by the legislative body for the purpose of adoption (Hay and 
Menon, 2007: 171).  
 The holder of legislative authority in the inter-governmental setting is the Council of the 
European Union (Europa, 2008); an institution composed of representatives of each member state 
‘who may commit the government of the member state in question and cast its vote’ (Article 
16(2) of TEU). This means that in order for a proposed policy (from the Commission or member 
state) to be adopted, the Council must pass it; and because the Council is composed of the 
representatives of each member state, individual member states have a degree of control over 
which acts are adopted, and which are not. The amount of control is determined by the voting 
system employed. The European Parliament, on the other hand, does not have legislative 
authority in this decision-making setting. It is limited to being, at best, a consultative and 
information sharing entity (Nugent, 2006: 192). 
  The voting system of the legislative body in the inter-governmental setting (the Council) 
is one of unanimity, which means that in order for an act to be adopted it must be agreed upon by 
all member states (Nugent, 2006: 211). This provides the individual member states with a 
significant amount of control. Since unanimity is needed, by voting against an act, a member 
state can block its adoption; thereby deciding, individually, what is adopted and what is not. 
 The inter-governmental decision-making setting provides the individual member states 
with a significant amount of power to affect the result of the decision-making process. It thus 
represents the lowest amount of political integration in this model.  
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 The semi-supranational setting provides less control to the individual member states, than 
does the inter-governmental setting. The holder of policy initiating authority is solely the 
Commission (Hay and Menon, 2007: 171); an institution composed of 27 commissioners (one 
from each member state) who, in carrying out their responsibilities, are ‘completely independent’ 
of their national governments (Article 17(3) of TEU). Thus, within the semi-supranational setting 
the individual member states do not have the power of agenda setting, which eliminates their 
ability to control the policy initiation stage— ability provided them by the inter-governmental 
setting.  
 The holder of legislative authority, and its voting system, in this setting is the same as in 
the inter-governmental setting; the European Parliament plays only a consultative and 
information sharing role (Bache and George, 2006: 242). Therefore, within the semi-
supranational setting the individual member states have the same degree of control over what is 
adopted, and what is not, as they do in the inter-governmental setting.  
 Although the semi-supranational decision-making setting provides the individual member 
states with the same degree of control in the adoption stage of the decision-making process, as 
does the inter-governmental setting; it reduces their control in the policy initiation stage—thereby 
diminishing their overall control in the decision-making process. The semi-supranational setting, 
therefore, represents the medium amount of political integration in this model. 
 The supranational decision-making setting provides the member states with the lowest 
amount of control over the outcome of the decision-making process; and thus, represents the 
highest amount of political integration in this model. The holder of policy initiating authority is, 
as in the semi-supranational setting, solely the Commission (Hay and Menon, 2007: 171). 
Therefore, also as in the semi-supranational setting, the member states do not have the ability to 
decide what is received, and how, by the legislative body for the purpose of adoption.  
  Legislative authority, in this decision-making setting, is held by two institutions: the 
Council and the European Parliament (Hay and Menon, 2007: 182); the European parliament 
being an institution composed of 750 directly elected ‘representatives of the Union’s citizens’ 
(Article 14(2) of TEU). Whereas in the inter-governmental and semi-supranational settings acts 
are adopted by Council approval alone, in the supranational setting acts must be approved by 
both the Council and the European Parliament (Bache and George, 2006: 243-45). Consequently, 
the fate of an act is not only determined by representatives of each member state—those directly 
controlled by national governments—but also by the 750 representatives of EU citizens—those 
not directly controlled by national governments. As a result, individual member-state control is 
reduced. 
 The amount of individual member-state control is further reduced by the voting system 
employed by the Council in the supranational decision-making setting—that of qualified majority 
voting.2 Since it means individual member states can be outvoted, and that they have no veto, the 
use of QMV in the Council significantly decreases the control of individual member states (Hay 
and Menon, 2007: 177). 
 In sum, the decision making setting that represents the lowest degree of political 
integration in this model is the inter-governmental setting; the one that represents the medium 
degree of political integration in this model is the semi-supranational setting; and the one that 
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Policy areas 
 The policy areas identified by this model as being of ‘a political character’ are: asylum 
and immigration, internal customs, external border control and police and judicial cooperation.3 
The categorisation of these four policy areas as such, is not the result of a random process. 
Rather, this categorisation is due to the fact that, when the 12 member states of the, then, 
European Economic Community decided to establish a “political union” they incorporated, into 
this union, the previously mentioned policy areas; all of which were placed in the “Justice and 
Home Affairs” pillar of the newly formed—by the Maastricht Treaty—“European Union” 
(Nugent, 2006: 84-91).4  
 
A More Political EU: the Effect of Lisbon’s Institutional Changes      
 This section will first provide some essential background information regarding the EU 
structure in the pre- and post-Amsterdam and Nice periods. It will then discuss the two 
institutional changes introduced by the fully implemented Lisbon Treaty and their effect on the 
political integration of the EU. In so doing, it will demonstrate that the reason these changes 
reduce individual member-state control in the policy areas concerned, and in turn increase EU 
political integration, is because they shift these policy areas from the inter-governmental and 
semi-supranational decision-making settings to the supranational setting.  
 As already alluded to in the previous section, the Maastricht Treaty, which came into 
effect in November 1993 and transformed the EEC into the EU, organised the newly formed EU 
into three pillars: the European Communities (EC) pillar, the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) pillar5 and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar (Yesilada and Wood, 2010: 
49-50). With regards to the three ‘decision-making settings’ outlined in the previous section, the 
EC pillar can be categorised as both semi-supranational and supranational; the reason being that 
within the EC pillar different decision-making processes are used depending on the policy issue. 
For some issues the process reflects a semi-supranational decision-making setting—the 
Commission initiates policies and the Council adopts them voting by unanimity—for others the 
process reflects a supranational setting—the Commission initiates policies and both the European 
Parliament and the Council adopt them; the Council voting by QMV (Bache and George, 2006: 
243-45; Europa, 2008; Hay and Menon, 2007: 171, 177, 182; Nugent, 2006: 87-89, 211).  The 
JHA pillar, on the other hand, can be categorised as inter-governmental; the reason being that 
within the JHA pillar the decision-making process follows an inter-governmental line—both the 
Commission and the member states initiate policies and the Council adopts them voting by 
unanimity (Europa, 2008; Nugent, 2006: 211).  
 Under the pre-Amsterdam framework, the EC pillar dealt first and foremost with the 
economic policy areas of the EU, including:  monetary union, competition policy, development 
aid policy, research and technological development and environmental policy (Nugent, 2006: 89). 
The JHA pillar, in contrast, dealt with all of the policy areas under consideration in this article: 
asylum and immigration policy, internal customs policy, external border control policy and police 
and judicial cooperation policy (Nugent, 2006: 91). Therefore, prior to the Amsterdam Treaty, all 
four policy areas concerned in this article were dealt with within an inter-governmental decision-
making setting. However, with the coming into effect of Amsterdam in 1999, this situation 
changed (Sbragia and Stolfi, 2010: 424). 
 The Amsterdam Treaty, a reform treaty of the Maastricht Treaty, transferred some of the 
JHA-pillar policy areas—asylum and immigration policy and judicial cooperation in civil matters 
(part of the police and judicial cooperation policy area)—into the EC pillar (Nugent, 2006: 97). 
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As a result, the post-Amsterdam organisation of the policy areas concerned in this article—as it 
relates to the three ‘decision-making settings’—was as follows: asylum and immigration policy, 
as well as judicial cooperation in civil matters, were within a semi-supranational setting; while 
internal customs policy, external border control policy, and the remainder of the police and 
judicial cooperation policy area, remained within an inter-governmental decision-making setting. 
With the entering into force of another Maastricht reform treaty, the Treaty of Nice, in 2003 the 
situation changed slightly once again. 
 The Treaty of Nice further decreased individual member-state control in one of the policy 
areas transferred from the JHA pillar to the EC pillar by the Amsterdam Treaty—judicial 
cooperation in civil matters. In the post-Nice period, this policy area was dealt with within a 
supranational decision-making setting—the Commission initiates and the Council and EP adopt, 
the Council voting by QMV (Europa, 2007).  
 In sum, during the post-Nice and pre-Lisbon period, the asylum and immigration policy 
area was dealt with within the semi-supranational decision-making setting of the EC pillar; 
judicial cooperation in civil matters was dealt with within the supranational setting of the EC 
pillar; and the internal customs policy area, the external border control policy area and the 
remainder of the police and judicial cooperation policy area remained within the inter-
governmental setting of the JHA pillar. This article will now outline the two institutional changes 
introduced by the fully implemented Lisbon treaty, and demonstrate how they shift the policy 
areas concerned from the semi-supranational and inter-governmental decision-making settings to 
the supranational setting, thereby increasing the political integration of the EU.  
 
Dissolution of pillar system 
 The Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009 (BBC News, 2010), and with 
its full implementation—a process due to occur over the next decade—two main institutional 
changes will be introduced. One of these changes is the dissolution of the pillar system created by 
the Maastricht Treaty (Reh, 2009: 635), a change that shifts the remaining policy areas of the 
JHA pillar to the EC pillar—the EC pillar becoming the only “pillar” of the EU (Sbragia and 
Stolfi, 2010: 425).6 As a result, those policy areas of the JHA pillar unaffected by the Amsterdam 
or Nice treaties—internal customs policy, external border control policy and the remainder of the 
police and judicial cooperation policy area—are transferred to the EC pillar, and are no longer 
dealt with within an inter-governmental decision-making setting; the policy areas previously 
relocated to the EC pillar from the JHA pillar by the Amsterdam Treaty are unaffected by this 
institutional change.  
 
The ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ 
 In addition to the dissolution of the pillar system, the fully implemented Lisbon Treaty 
also identifies the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ as being the adoption of acts by means of co-
decision, with qualified majority voting (QMV) being used in the Council of the EU (General 
Secretariat of the Council of the EU, 2009). QMV is a voting system that, under the Lisbon 
framework, requires a double majority; that is, an act must be approved by at least 55 % of the 
EU member states (i.e. 15 member states) that contain at least 65 % of the EU’s population 
(General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, 2009). Co-decision, on the other hand, is the 
legislative procedure whereby both the European Parliament and the Council of the EU are 
required to approve an act in order for it to be adopted; that is, the European Parliament acts as a 
‘co-decider’ with the Council (Bache and George, 2006: 243-45).  
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 Identifying the combination of QMV and co-decision as the ‘ordinary legislative 
procedure’, leads to the employment of this combination in the decision-making process 
concerning the majority of policy areas; the four policy areas discussed in this article—asylum 
and immigration policy, internal customs policy, external border control policy and police and 
judicial cooperation policy—being members of this majority (Article 77 of TFEU; Article 78 of 
TFEU; Article 79 of TFEU; Article 81 of TFEU; Article 82 of TFEU; Article 83 of TFEU; 
Article 84 TFEU; Article 87 of TFEU). 
 In sum, the dissolution of the pillar system transfers the remaining policy areas of the 
JHA pillar into the EC pillar, establishing the Commission as the sole policy initiator when 
dealing with these policy areas. Furthermore, the recognition of the QMV/co-decision 
combination as the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ means that, when dealing with the newly 
transferred policies of the JHA pillar, as well as the policies transferred previously by the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the holders of legislative authority are the EP and the Council—the voting 
system of the Council being QMV. Therefore, the institutional changes of the fully implemented 
treaty shift the four policy areas discussed in this article from the inter-governmental and semi-
supranational decision-making settings to the supranational setting; thereby decreasing individual 




 This article has argued that with the full implementation of the Lisbon Treaty the 
European Union will become more politically integrated in nature. In order to prove this thesis, 
this article has developed a model to determine degrees of EU political integration, asserting that 
the degree of integration is determined by the amount of individual member-state control in the 
decision-making process concerning policy areas of a political nature; control being defined as 
the ability of individual member states to alter the outcome of the decision-making process. For 
the purpose of gauging control, the developed model has outlined three ‘decision-making 
settings’—the inter-governmental setting (lowest level of political integration), the semi-
supranational setting (medium level of political integration) and the supranational setting (highest 
level of political integration). This article has then used these decision-making settings to 
demonstrate that it is through the introduction of institutional changes that the fully implemented 
Lisbon Treaty increases EU political integration; these institutional changes shifting the four 
policy areas categorised as ‘political in character’ from the inter-governmental and semi-
supranational decision-making settings to the supranational setting.  
 This article has only focused on the decision-making process within the EU as a means of 
measuring EU political integration. However, the decision-making process is only one facet of 
the EU machinery. In a more comprehensive study, the implementation process should also be 
included, the amount of individual member-state control in the implementation process being 
another valuable measure of EU political integration. Furthermore, in a larger project the CFSP 
pillar and its policy areas should also be included, in order to obtain a more complete picture. 
     	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 These ‘decision-making settings’ are based on the different decision-making processes used when dealing with the 
four policy areas identified by this model as ‘ political in nature’; both in the pre- and post-Lisbon periods.  
2 The voting system of the parliament is not relevant here since it is never unanimity, and since it does not affect 
individual member-state control over the outcome of the decision-making process. The significant point is that the 
EP is a co-legislator with the Council. 
	  
Mapping Politics 
Volume 2,  Fall 2010 
46 
	  
3 This policy area is comprised of judicial cooperation in civil matters, judicial cooperation in criminal matters and 
police cooperation. The Lisbon Treaty does not weaken individual member-state control in ‘judicial cooperation in 
civil matters’.  
4 They also included in the political union the areas of foreign and security policy, which were placed in the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar of the EU. This model does not incorporate these policy areas 
due to the limited size of this project, and the resultant inability to deal with the complexities involved with doing so. 
5 The CFSP pillar will not be discussed. 
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